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HUMAN FACTORS IN INFORMATION-AGE  
TRADE SECRET PROTECTION 
 
Dan Elbaum 
 
Trade secret information security involves a multi-dimensional array of human, legal, and 
technological factors.
1
 I argue that organizational culture, employee policies, and other 
human factors are fundamental prerequisites to the successful implementation of legal 
and technological security measures. After a brief introduction to trade secret law for the 
nonlegal reader, I present an overview of trade secret litigation and an analysis of 
computer hacking strategy to emphasize the extent to which the legal and technological 
dimensions of trade secret information security are predicated on human factors. I 
conclude with a discussion of how human resource policy can engender cultural 
sensitivity to trade secrets and mitigate the risk of information leakage. 
 
Important Nuances of Trade Secret Law 
 
To contextualize HR‘s role in trade secret protection, a brief walk through the law of 
trade secrets is in order. At the broadest level, trade secrets are a form of intellectual 
property that protect confidential business information. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act is 
the operative trade secret law in 46 states and the District of Columbia. To qualify as a 
protectable trade secret under the UTSA, three principal elements must be established: 
(1) the information must have value, either actual or potential, (2) the information must 
not be generally known to the public or readily ascertainable, and (3) the information 
must be protected by reasonable efforts.
2
 The nuanced legal meanings of these elements 
warrant further explanation.
3
 
 
The secrecy element requires only that information not be ―generally known‖ or ―readily 
ascertainable.‖4 Popular examples of trade secrets that involve heavily guarded 
information, such as the Coca-Cola formula, tend to create the misleading impression that 
top-secrecy is a requirement of trade secret law. Although the Coca-Cola formula is 
known by only a few Coca-Cola employees,
5
 that level of absolute secrecy is not required 
by law.
6
 Next, the information‘s value must be ―derived‖ from the fact that the 
information is more valuable because it is unknown to others.
7
 Then, the secret valuable 
information must be protected using efforts ―reasonable under the circumstances to 
maintain [its] secrecy.‖ In this context, the requirement that protection efforts be 
―reasonable‖ means that more valuable information must be afforded a higher level of 
protection.
8
 The word ―maintain‖ is used because protection must be ongoing and 
continuous
9—because secrecy once compromised cannot be restored. A momentary lapse 
in protection can destroy the trade secret status of information, so sustained protection is 
critical.
10
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Trade secret protection therefore involves four basic steps: (1) identifying secret 
information, (2) valuating the information, (3) assessing the risks associated with the 
information, and (4) implementing security measures that confer a level of protection 
commensurate with the information‘s value and risk exposure.11 Following these steps 
helps to prevent the incidence of leaks and also serves to establish the track record of 
protection that is necessary to enforce to trade secret rights through litigation. 
 
The Limited Role of Attorneys in Trade Secret Protection 
 
To obtain a legal remedy for trade secret misappropriation, the trade secret owner must 
establish the secrecy, value, and protection elements discussed previously. Courts often 
look to human resource policies such as employee training and termination procedures to 
determine whether the information has been adequately guarded to justify legal 
protection.
12
 For that reason, a documented, demonstrable history of human resource 
practices that exhibit such protections is crucial to the plaintiff‘s case in trade secret 
litigation. Conversely, a history of inadequate protections can be found as partially to 
blame for the leaked information and ultimately prevent a plaintiff from securing a 
remedy.
13
 
 
The first step in establishing such a record of protections is to have an attorney draft job-
specific appropriate non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) for all workers with access to 
confidential information. However, note that NDAs are not the be-all end-all of trade 
secret protection. NDAs only initiate what should be an ongoing trade secret protection 
effort. NDAs subject workers to confidentiality obligations but do so in broad, abstract 
language that is not translatable into clear guidelines for behavior. Protecting trade 
secrets requires more than eliciting from workers a promise to refrain from intentionally 
making unauthorized disclosures. After NDAs are in place, special policies and 
procedures must be adopted to provide special procedures for the handling of sensitive 
information and to reduce the likelihood of inadvertent disclosure. HR must ensure that 
these measures are enforced and taken seriously by workers. When trade secrets go to 
trial, the quality of such protections can be determinative. 
 
Computer Security Risks in Perspective 
 
The perspective of computer hackers is worth considering with regard to the relationship 
between technological security and information security. Kevin Mitnick is an expert 
hacker who is famous for the unprecedentedly restrictive conditions of his release from 
prison. The terms of Mitnick‘s release included a complete prohibition of operating any 
electronic equipment that has the capability to act as or access any form of network or 
computer system. Since his release under those conditions, Mitnick has provided expert 
testimony on computer security before the House and the Senate. In that testimony, he 
has emphasized that the most effective methods for circumventing technological security 
are of a less technological character than one might expect.
14
 His attack strategy focuses 
heavily on psychologically manipulating people into voluntarily divulging sensitive 
information that they do not recognize has application to the exploitation of 
vulnerabilities in their computer systems.
15
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Mitnick‘s emphasis on the human factors of information security helps to explain the 
WikiLeaks fiasco that has brought information security to the forefront of public 
consciousness. The WikiLeaks breach was not the result of a technologically 
sophisticated attack. The 21-year-old U.S. Army intelligence analyst who allegedly 
supplied the documents to WikiLeaks obtained the files through a network he was 
authorized to access, downloading them onto his local machine and simply burning them 
onto a CD. The attack vector, as security analysts would term it, was enabled by a 
shortcoming of human resource policy at his facility. Presumably, the policy that should 
have prohibited the use of removable media either did not exist or was not enforced. The 
WikiLeaks scenario demonstrates the continuing relevance of Mitnick‘s view that 
security is primarily a matter of people, even in ostensibly technology-specific breaches.  
 
Trade Secret Protection Policy and HR Considerations 
 
In order to preserve the confidentiality of information, workers throughout the 
organization must be attuned to the importance of information security. To develop that 
awareness, many companies institute a trade secret protection plan as part of company 
policy. Trade secret protection plans provide concrete, specific procedures for 
safeguarding secret information and help to engender information security awareness. 
They typically provide special procedures for confidential information designation, 
physical facility access control, employee training programs, and computer security. 
 
Procedures for the designation and distribution of confidential information should be 
established in company policy. When designating information as confidential, 
specifically identify exactly what pieces of information are confidential, when they were 
conceived, and what persons or groups have been authorized to access them. In 
describing the information, be explicit and avoid overbroad designations. Confidential 
documents in physical or digital forms should be watermarked and distributed on a 
strictly need-to-know basis. 
 
Physical access to offices and facilities should be regulated for both employees and 
visitors. The purpose of such regulations is to limit access to authorized personnel and 
escorted visitors only, and to prevent unescorted visitors from overhearing, viewing, or 
otherwise accessing sensitive information. Physical security measures vary substantially 
across industries. For example, pharmaceutical companies that perform expensive 
scientific research might require biometric authentication to enter their facilities. Their 
employees would likely be required to wear photo identification badges at all times, and 
visitors would probably need to be escorted. For companies with budgetary constraints or 
lower security requirements might simply implement a visitor sign-in sheet that includes 
a brief confidentiality clause might be appropriate. 
 
Digital document storage and transmission also warrant special procedures. Although 
elementary, digital files that contain particularly valuable confidential information should 
be protected with secure passwords of at least eight characters. If office computers that 
store confidential information are internetworked, each machine should be password-
protected. Highly sensitive information should only be loaded onto computers that are 
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 4 
physically located on company premises and specially configured to meet high security 
requirements. Finally, newly hired employees and contractors should be trained on these 
policies upon hire and be periodically re-trained where applicable. Periodic re-training on 
such procedures has been found by courts to be evidence to show the required 
―reasonable‖ protection efforts.16 If confidential information is being handled on a routine 
basis or as part of a long-term project, consider issuing periodic memoranda to remind 
personnel of the importance of compliance. 
 
These procedures are merely illustrative examples, and every company needs to conduct 
its own inquiry to determine the specific level of protection warranted on the basis of the 
value and risk exposure of its trade secret information. However, in every circumstance 
the objective is to effectuate a level of security commensurate with the value of the trade 
secrets under protection.  
 
Conclusion 
 
HR professionals play a critical and continuous role in trade secret protection that is at 
least as important as those of attorneys and IT professionals. Although information 
security and trade secret protection are technological and legal concepts, respectively, 
they boil down to proper people management. The biggest threat to the security of trade 
secret information in the contemporary business environment remains the people who 
possess it. That risk can be managed with trade secret protection policies that establish 
internal controls for sensitive information. This reinforces to workers that confidentiality 
preservation requires not just an abstract promise but also concrete action. Once trade 
secret protection policies have been formally adopted, employee compliance must be 
continually monitored and enforced in order to prepare a track record of diligent 
protection that legal counsel can present in court if litigation unfolds. 
 
It is easy to forget that the law requires continuous protections efforts. Only a brief 
moment of oversight is needed for a secret to inadvertently leak. ℵ 
 
Dan Elbaum is a student at Florida International University, pursuing a juris doctorate 
at the university’s College of Law. He also holds an M.S. in Management from the 
Warrington College of Business Administration, University of Florida. 
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